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 A happy divorce, very much like a happy marriage, is not easy to come by. Being 
forced to fight with your spouse in court over your money, children, home, or 
anything else either of you can think of hardly encourages a happy ending. While an 
ending may never be “happy,” for those divorcees who retain some respect for their 
former significant other it can at least be cordial—if they can manage to stay out of 
court. A provision in the New York Domestic Relations Law (DRL), however, 
enables spouses to do just that, and terminate a dead marriage “for which there is no 
hope of reconciliation”1 by obtaining a divorce pursuant to a separation agreement.2 
If, after entering into a valid separation agreement, the spouses live “separate and 
apart” for one year pursuant to the terms of that agreement, DRL section 170(6) 
allows them to “convert” their separation agreement into a final divorce decree 
without having to battle over the terms of their settlement in court. 3 Of course, this 
“conversion divorce” is only available for those marriages in which there is no hope of 
reconciliation, and the separation agreement is evidence that the spouses are, in fact, 
living separate and apart.4 Thus, if the parties to a valid separation agreement 
subsequently reconcile and resume their marital relationship with the intent to 
abandon the separation agreement, that agreement is deemed void.5 As the supposedly 
“dead” marriage has been resurrected, a divorce can no longer be sought based on an 
agreement meant to evince the separate state of the parties.6 Because reconciliation is 
at odds with the existence of the separation agreement, reconciliation is always a 
question of fact to be determined by the court through consideration of the parties’ 
conduct.7
 In Sifre v. Sifre, the New York Appellate Division, Third Department, refused to 
allow Mrs. Sifre to introduce evidence of a possible reconciliation as a defense to a 
divorce action instituted by her husband pursuant to DRL section 170(6).8 In Sifre, 
1. Lapidus v. Lapidus, 420 N.Y.S.2d 896, 897 (1st Dep’t 1979).
2. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 170(6) (McKinney 2003).
3. See Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63, 69 (1977).
4. See id. at 69 (“[T]he function of the [separation agreement] is ‘merely to authenticate the fact of 
separation.’” (quoting Gleason v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 28, 37 (1970))).
5. See, e.g., In re Estate of Wilson, 50 N.Y.2d 59, 66 (1980) (“[B]ecause the spouses have effected a 
reconciliation . . . [t]he conduct of the spouses may be understood to manifest an intention to void the 
agreement in its entirety.”); In re Estate of Whiteford, 314 N.Y.S.2d 811, 813 (3d Dep’t 1970); In re 
Estate of Granchelli, 393 N.Y.S.2d 894, 896 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1977).
6. See Christian, 42 N.Y.2d at 69.
7. See In re Estate of Whiteford, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 813 (“The existence of such intent [to abandon a separation 
agreement] is primarily a factual question, to be decided in the first instance by the trier of fact . . . .”); 
Wilson, 50 N.Y.2d at 66.
8. See Sifre v. Sifre (Sifre II), 878 N.Y.S.2d 798, 800 (3d Dep’t 2009). The New York DRL provides, in 
pertinent part:
An action for divorce may be maintained by a husband or wife to procure a judgment 
divorcing the parties and dissolving the marriage on any of the following grounds . . . 
(6) The husband and wife have lived separate and apart pursuant to a written agreement 
of separation, subscribed by the parties thereto and acknowledged or proved in the form 
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the issue on appeal was whether the language contained in the parties’ separation 
agreement (“Agreement”) prohibited her from demonstrating—by means other than 
a writing—that she and her husband had reconciled with the intent to resume their 
marital relationship.9 The Agreement stated that none of its provisions “shall be 
changed or modified, nor shall this Agreement be discharged or terminated in whole 
or in part, except by an instrument in writing.”10 The Third Department concluded 
that the requirement that any termination of the Agreement be in writing meant that 
any abandonment of the Agreement must also be in writing.11 In the absence of any 
such writing, the court deemed the issue of reconciliation to be “irrelevant.”12 This 
case comment contends that the Third Department, in granting Mr. Sifre a divorce, 
erred in three ways. First, it improperly relied on the Agreement as the sole basis for 
granting the divorce instead of the actual separation between the parties.13 Second, it 
justified doing so by ignoring established principles of contract interpretation.14 
Third, the court’s interpretation of the Agreement allowed Mr. Sifre to procure a 
divorce in a manner contrary to public policy, thereby effectively rendering the 
Agreement itself void.15
 Mr. Sifre and Mrs. Sifre were married on October 4, 1981.16 In November 2000, 
they separated;17 the Agreement was signed on November 27, 2000.18 In February 
required to entitle a deed to be recorded, for a period of one or more years after the 
execution of such agreement and satisfactory proof has been submitted by the plaintiff 
that he or she has substantially performed all the terms and conditions of such 
agreement.
 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 170(6) (McKinney 2003).
9. See Sifre II, 878 N.Y.S.2d at 800. In addition to the issue of whether the Agreement permitted extrinsic 
evidence to be introduced, Mrs. Sifre also alleged that the Agreement was unconscionable in its terms 
and that Mr. Sifre had not substantially complied with its terms. Brief for Defendant-Respondent at 5, 
Sifre v. Sifre, 878 N.Y.S.2d 798 (3d Dep’t 2009) (No. 08-568). The Third Department also found those 
arguments to be without merit. See Sifre II, 878 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
10. Sifre II, 878 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 800.
13. See Dom. Rel. § 170(6); see also Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63, 70 (1970) (“[I]t is the physical 
separation, rather than the writing, which constitutes the actual basis of the cause . . . .” (citing 
Littlejohns v. Littlejohns, 349 N.Y.S.2d 462, 468 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972))); Buckley v. Buckley, 
537 N.Y.S.2d 943, 943 (Sup. Ct. Saratoga County 1989) (“It is . . . the physical separation which 
constitutes the grounds for divorce under [DRL] § 170(6), not the agreement.”); infra text accompanying 
notes 46–57.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 58–82.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 85–93; Restatement (Second) of Contracts: Promise 
Detrimental to Marital Relationship § 190(2) (1981) (“A promise that tends unreasonably to 
encourage divorce or separation is unenforceable on grounds of public policy.”).





2008, more than seven years after the execution of the Agreement, Mr. Sifre 
commenced divorce proceedings.19 At that time, the parties had been married for 
twenty-six years.20 Mrs. Sifre contested the divorce action, arguing, among other 
things, that “the parties cohabitated together with the intent to reconcile subsequent 
to execution of the [A]greement.”21 Specifically, she asserted that she and Mr. Sifre 
cohabitated and reconciled after having been apart for only six months and thus, as a 
matter of law, the entire Agreement should be deemed abandoned and void.22 
Although it was undisputed that the parties spent time together after the execution 
of the Agreement,23 Mr. Sifre denied her allegations.24 He cross-moved for summary 
judgment, asking the court to grant him a conversion divorce pursuant to DRL 
section 170(6).25 Presented with conflicting affidavits from the parties regarding 
their alleged reconciliation, the trial court properly noted that a question of fact 
existed and the issue could not be resolved without a trial.26 Mr. Sifre’s motion for 
summary judgment to grant him a divorce was denied.27
 Mr. Sifre appealed the trial court’s decision denying his motion for summary 
judgment. He contended that, because he had substantially complied with the terms 
of the Agreement, any consideration by the court regarding reconciliation was 
barred.28 Consequently, he claimed that dismissal of Mrs. Sifre’s reconciliation 
defense was mandated.29 The Third Department granted his motion for summary 
judgment, thereby awarding him a conversion divorce.30 The court reasoned that the 
introduction of evidence other than “an instrument in writing” to demonstrate a 
possible reconciliation of the parties was prohibited because the language contained 
in the parties’ Agreement stated that none of its provisions “shall be changed or 
modified, nor shall this Agreement be discharged or terminated in whole or in part, 
19. Id. 
20. Sifre v. Sifre (Sifre I), No. 08-0568, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Ulster County Oct. 7, 2008) (on file with 
the author), rev’d, 878 N.Y.S.2d 798 (3d Dep’t 2009).
21. Id. 
22. See Brief for Defendant-Respondent, supra note 9, at 8; Sifre I, No. 08-0568 at 3. Mrs. Sifre alleged that 
she and Mr. Sifre resumed a sexual relationship, spent several nights a week together, attended social 
events together, vacationed together, and went out to dinner regularly. Id. at 8. 
23. See Sifre I, No. 08-0568 at 6; see also Brief for Defendant-Respondent, supra note 9, at 7.
24. Sifre I, No. 08-0568 at 2.
25. Id.; N.Y. Dom. Rel. § 170(6) (McKinney 2003).
26. See Sifre I, No. 08-0568 at 6, 7; Sifre II, 878 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
27. Sifre I, No. 08-0568 at 7. “Pre-trial discovery was never found with respect to the asserted facts [that the 
parties reconciled, and the agreed upon and disputed details of this almost eight year post-separation 
relationship accordingly have not yet been developed on the record.” Brief for Defendant-Respondent, 
supra note 9, at 8.
28. Brief for Defendant-Respondent, supra note 9, at 6; See Dom. Rel. § 170(6).
29. Brief for Defendant-Respondent, supra note 9, at 6.
30. See Sifre II, 878 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
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except by an instrument in writing.”31 As there was no such writing, the court deemed 
the issue of reconciliation “irrelevant.”32
 There is no clear standard in New York for determining whether spouses have 
reconciled and resumed their marital relationship. As the Court of Appeals has made 
clear, “cohabitation with the intent to reconcile” has no definite meaning and thus 
the factual context of the supposed reconciliation must always be considered.33 Courts 
have gone so far as to find an issue of fact even when explicit language in a separation 
agreement required that “reconciliation” of the parties be documented in a written 
statement. For example, in Katz v. Beckman, Mr. Katz filed for divorce from his wife 
pursuant to DRL section 170(6).34 The separation agreement provided, in part, that 
“[t]his Agreement shall not be invalidated or otherwise affected by a reconciliation 
between the parties hereto . . . unless said reconciliation . . . be documented in a 
written statement executed and acknowledged by the parties . . . .”35 Despite this 
clear language in the parties’ separation agreement, the Second Department still 
found that once the wife produced evidence that the parties did reconcile, an issue of 
fact was raised as to whether or not the parties intended to abandon the agreement 
altogether.36
 The lack of a clear standard has made these agreements subject to great controversy 
between spouses when it comes to their enforcement.37 Because a separation 
agreement will be deemed void when there has been cohabitation with the intent to 
reconcile between husband and wife indicating that the agreement has been 
abandoned, it cannot serve as a basis for a conversion divorce.38 Indeed, the Third 
31. See id. at 799–800.
32. Id. at 800.
33. See Graev v. Graev, 11 N.Y.3d 262, 274 (2008). In Graev, the spousal agreement between Mr. and Mrs. 
Graev contained a provision for the termination of spousal support payments on the event that Mrs. 
Graev “cohabits” with another man for a period of sixty consecutive days; however, the agreement did 
not define the word “cohabitation.” The Court of Appeals found that the word “cohabitation” was 
ambiguous and had no plain meaning adequately established in existing law. The Court held that, 
absent evidence as to the parties’ intent, there was no way to determine what acts “cohabitation” was 
meant to embrace. Id. at 266–74.
34. 756 N.Y.S.2d 258, 259 (2d Dep’t 2003).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 260; see also Buckley, 537 N.Y.S.2d 943, 943 (Sup. Ct. Saratoga County 1989).
37. See, e.g., Lippman v. Lippman, 596 N.Y.S.2d 241 (4th Dep’t 1993); Rosenhaus v. Rosenhaus, 503 
N.Y.S.2d 892 (2d Dep’t 1986); In re Estate of Whiteford, 314 N.Y.S.2d 811 (3d Dep’t 1970).
38. See Rosenhaus, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 892 (noting that a resumption of the marital relationship sufficient to 
indicate an abandonment of that agreement will “vitiate the separation agreement” (citing Brody v. 
Brody, 180 N.Y.S. 364, 365 (1st Dep’t 1920))); Whiteford, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 813 (“[A] reconciliation, 
resumption of the cohabitation and marital relations, accompanied by an intent to abandon a separation 
agreement renders that agreement void.” (citing Zimmer v. Settle, 124 N.Y. 37 (1891))); Zimtbaum v. 
Zimtbaum, 284 N.Y.S. 101 (2d Dep’t 1935); Buckley, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 943 (finding that, although the 
separation agreement at issue stated that it would still continue in “full force and effect” despite any 
reconciliation between the parties “except as otherwise provided by [a] written agreement,” in the face of 
a reconciliation the separation agreement could not stand even without such a writing).
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Department here did concede that reconciliation is, in fact, a defense to an action for 
conversion divorce,39 and whether Mr. and Mrs. Sifre cohabited with the intent to 
reconcile subsequent to execution of the Agreement is undeniably a question of fact. 
To make that determination, the court was required to look for unequivocal acts that 
demonstrated the parties intended to reconcile and abandon the Agreement.40 
Because the court determined that the issue of reconciliation was “irrelevant”41 and 
did not conduct the requisite fact finding, it is impossible to conclude with absolute 
certainty that Mr. and Mrs. Sifre did not cohabit with the intent to reconcile.
 In wrongly granting summary judgment to Mr. Sifre, the Third Department 
erred in three ways. First, it improperly relied on the Agreement to serve as the sole 
basis for granting the divorce, rather than considering any actual separation or 
reconciliation as required by law.42 Second, the court’s reasoning was borne from an 
impermissible construction of the parties’ Agreement; the Third Department ignored 
established principles of contract interpretation and construction by distorting the 
plain meaning of the terms used in the Agreement.43 Third, by construing the 
Agreement to prohibit evidence of reconciliation, the court granted the divorce in a 
manner contrary to public policy, thereby rendering the Agreement void.44
 It is well established in New York domestic relations case law that, unless the 
parties actually separate, a divorce based on a separation agreement cannot be 
granted.45 In New York, divorce is “a creature” designed solely by the legislature.46 As 
such, the only available grounds for divorce that are to be recognized by the courts in 
New York are those clearly stipulated by statute in DRL section 170: cruel and 
inhumane treatment, abandonment, confinement in prison, adultery, living apart 
pursuant to a decree of separation for more than one year, living apart pursuant to a 
written agreement of separation for more than one year, and irretrievable breakdown 
39. See Sifre II, 878 N.Y.S.2d 798, 799 (3d Dep’t 2009).
40. See Lippman, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 242 (“Abandonment may be shown circumstantially, by proof of the 
parties’ resumption of the marital relationship by unequivocal acts.” (citing Zambito v. Zambito, 566 
N.Y.S.2d 789 (3d Dep’t 1991))).
41. See Sifre II, 878 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
42. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 170(6) (McKinney 2003); see also Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63, 70 
(1970) (“[I]t is the physical separation, rather than the writing, which constitutes the actual basis of the 
cause . . . .”); Buckley v. Buckley, 537 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup. Ct. Saratoga County 1989) (“It is . . . the 
physical separation which constitutes the grounds for divorce under [DRL] § 170(6), not the 
agreement.”); supra text accompanying notes 46–57.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 58–82.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 85–93; Restatement (Second) of Contracts: Promise 
Detrimental to Marital Relationship § 190(2) (1981) (“A promise that tends unreasonably to 
encourage divorce or separation is unenforceable on grounds of public policy.”).
45. Buckley, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 943–44; see also Dom. Rel. § 170(6).
46. Buckley, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 943 (“Divorce in [New York] is a creature of the legislature, and the grounds 
upon which it may be granted are purely statutory.”); see also N.Y Const. art. II; N.Y. Stat. Law § 1 
(McKinney 2010) (“A statute is an act of the legislature . . . .”). 
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of the marriage for a period of at least six months.47 The operative element in DRL 
section 170(6), the ground on which Mr. Sifre was granted a divorce, is the actual 
living apart of the parties.48 As stated by the Court of Appeals in Christian v. Christian, 
it is the actual and physical separation of the parties, not the separation agreement, 
which provides the grounds for a conversion divorce under DRL section 170(6).49 The 
separation agreement primarily serves an evidentiary function; it authenticates the 
separate state of the parties.50 Thus, proof separate and independent of the agreement 
is admissible to determine whether the statutory requirement of DRL section 170(6), 
that the parties actually lived separate and apart, was fulfilled.51 Without an actual 
separation, there is no ground for a conversion divorce under the statute.52
 The Third Department, in granting Mr. Sifre a divorce without a finding that the 
parties in fact lived separate and apart for the requisite year, fabricated its own ground 
for divorce in New York State—divorce based solely upon the existence of a separation 
agreement. The Third Department deemed the issue of whether the parties actually 
lived separate and apart pursuant to their separation agreement to be “irrelevant” in 
the face of the language of the Agreement.53 However, the statute makes clear that 
three factors must be proved: (1) there is a formal document containing the terms of 
the separation, (2) that the parties have substantially complied with those terms, and 
(3) “that the parties have lived apart . . . for the statutorily required period.”54 Only 
once all of these requirements are met does “the right to a divorce become[] absolute.”55 
Here, by preventing Mrs. Sifre from introducing evidence of a possible reconciliation, 
the Third Department granted Mr. Sifre a divorce based solely upon the existence of 
the separation agreement—a ground for divorce not permitted by statute.56 
Consequently, the divorce should not have been granted.
 Secondly, the Third Department created its own ground for divorce by 
misinterpreting the Sifres’ Agreement. The Agreement at issue stated that none of 
its provisions “shall be changed or modified, nor shall this Agreement be discharged 
47. Dom. Rel. § 170; No Fault Divorce Act, ch. 384, 2010 N.Y. Laws 3890 (codified as amended at N.Y. 
Dom. Rel. Law § 170(7) (2010)).
48. Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63, 70 (1970).
49. See id. (“[I]t is the physical separation, rather than the writing, which constitutes the actual basis of the 
cause . . . .”) (citations omitted); see also Buckley, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 943–44.
50. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d at 69, 70; Buckley, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 943–44.
51. See Christian, 42 N.Y.2d at 70.
52. See Dom. Rel. § 170(6); Buckley, 537 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
53. See Sifre II, 878 N.Y.S.2d 798, 800 (3d Dep’t 2009).
54. P.B. v. L.B., 855 N.Y.S.2d 836, 842 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County 2008) (citing Gleason v. Gleason, 26 
N.Y.2d 28, 35 (1970)). See also Dom. Rel. § 170(6).
55. P.B., 855 N.Y.S.2d at 842 (“Once there has been a separation for one or more years following the 
execution and acknowledgement of the prescribed separation agreement . . . the right to a divorce 
becomes absolute.” (citing Tanleff v. Tanleff, N.Y.S.2d 433 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County (1969))).
56. See Dom. Rel. § 170(6).
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or terminated in whole or in part, except by an instrument in writing.”57 When 
interpreting the clear, unambiguous language of the Agreement that required a 
“termination” to be in writing, the Third Department ignored established principles 
of contract interpretation58 and inappropriately found that the word “termination” 
was intended by the Sifres’ to be a stand-in for “abandon.” As a result, the court 
concluded that there could be no abandonment of the Agreement unless evinced by 
a writing.59
 “A separation agreement is a contract subject to the principles of contract 
construction and interpretation.”60 Parties to such an agreement, like parties to any 
other contract, will be conclusively bound by its terms unless it is set aside.61 If such 
an agreement is complete and unambiguous, it must be enforced according to the 
“plain meaning of its terms.”62 Most importantly, a court may not re-write the 
agreement by distorting or changing the meaning of the terms used, as this would 
effectively create a new contract for the parties “under the guise of interpreting the 
writing.”63 For example, a court may not substitute the word “abandon” in contractual 
agreements between spouses when, in fact, “termination” was the word chosen and 
used by the parties in the Agreement.
 To terminate is “to end.”64 When a contract is terminated, the respective duties of 
the parties under it are discharged, meaning the parties are no longer required to 
fulfill their obligations under the agreement, such as the payment of child support or 
maintenance. Termination of an agreement can only be achieved by the express 
mutual assent of the parties.65 When a contract contains a provision that states it may 
not be terminated unless the cancellation is in writing, the assent to termination by 
the parties must be contained in writing.66
 However, the law in New York regarding the effect of reconciliation on separation 
agreements is clear; the agreement will be abandoned and rendered void upon a 
57. See Sifre II, 878 N.Y.S.2d at 799 (emphasis added).
58. See infra text accompanying notes 61–69. 
59. See Sifre II, 878 N.Y.S.2d at 799 (“The parties therefore required that a termination of the separation 
agreement—i.e., an abandonment of it—must be in writing.”).
60. Graev v. Graev, 11 N.Y.3d 262, 276 (2008) (quoting Matter of Meccico v. Meccico, 76 N.Y.2d 822, 
823–24 (1990)); see also Clark v. Clark, 827 N.Y.S.2d 159, 160–61 (2d Dep’t 2006).
61. See Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63, 71 (1970).
62. Graev, 11 N.Y.3d at 276 (quoting Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 562, 570 (2002)).
63. Smith v. Smith, 874 N.Y.S.2d 300, 302 (3d Dep’t 2009) (citing Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v. 538 Madison 
Realty Co., 1 N.Y.3d 470, 475 (2004)).
64. Black’s Law Dictionary 1609 (9th ed. 2009) (“[T]ermination, n. 1. The act of ending 
something . . . .[T]erminate, vb. 1. To put an end to; to bring to an end. 2. To end; to conclude.”).
65. See M.J. Posner Constr. Co. v. Valley View Dev. Corp., 499 N.Y.S.2d 997, 999 (3d Dep’t 1986).
66. See id.; see also N.Y Gen. Oblig. Law § 15-301(4) (McKinney 2003) (“If a written agreement or other 
written instrument contains a provision for termination . . . on written notice . . . the requirement that 
such notice be in writing cannot be waived except by a writing signed by the party . . . .”).
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showing of evidence of the reconciliation.67 This is because a reconciliation of the 
parties does not simply end the agreement and relieve a party of their obligations 
under it as a termination would; when an agreement is abandoned, it is as if it had 
never been.68 An abandoned agreement is rendered invalid, nullified, revoked, 
vitiated, and voided in its entirety69—undoubtedly a much harsher effect than simply 
bringing any one or all of its provisions to an end. Proof of abandonment is not 
limited to any one form; it is instead shown circumstantially by inferring from the 
parties’ conduct and the surrounding circumstances.70 Additionally, abandonment 
need not be expressed in words, and a contract will generally be considered abandoned 
when the acts of the parties are inconsistent with the continued existence of the 
contract.71 In the case of a separation agreement, a reconciliation of the parties is 
inconsistent with the continued existence of the agreement, which is intended to 
evince their separate state; accordingly, reconciliation renders the agreement 
abandoned.72
 Further, when reconciliation occurs and the separation of the parties fails, the 
consideration for the separation agreement also fails.73 Without valid consideration, 
67. See In re Estate of Whiteford, 314 N.Y.S.2d 811, 813 (3d Dep’t 1970) (“[A] reconciliation . . . renders 
that agreement void.”); see also Rosenhaus v. Rosenhaus, 503 N.Y.S.2d 892, 893 (2d Dep’t 1986) (“In 
order to vitiate the separation agreement, there must be ‘such a resumption of the marital relation as to 
indicate an intention to abandon the agreement of separation.’” (quoting Brody v. Brody, 180 N.Y.S. 364 
(1st Dep’t 1920))).
68. See In re Estate of Granchelli, 393 N.Y.S.2d 894, 896–97 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1977) (“The legal 
effect of a reconciliation between a husband and wife after executing a Separation Agreement is to 
return the parties to the position they were in . . . prior to executing the agreement.”).
69. See Thompson v. Thompson, 741 N.Y.S.2d 641, 642 (4th Dep’t 2002) (“[A] resumption of the marital 
relationship . . . will invalidate the agreement.”); see also Sepenoski v. Sepenoski, 591 N.Y.S.2d 63 (2d 
Dep’t 1992); Freeman v. Freeman, 562 N.Y.S.2d 269 (4th Dep’t 1990); Whiteford, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
70. In re Estate of Schanzer, 182 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1st Dep’t 1959), aff ’d, 8 N.Y.2d 972, 972 (1960); see also 
General Motors Accept. Corp. v. Clifton-Fine Cent. Sch. Dist., 85 N.Y.2d 232, 236 (1995); Lippman v. 
Lippman, 596 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242 (4th Dep’t 1993) (“Abandonment may be shown circumstantially . . . 
[and is] to be resolved by proof of the acts and expressions of the parties . . . .”); In re Estate of Wilson, 
50 N.Y.2d 59, 66 (1980) (“[C]onduct of the spouses may be understood to manifest an intention to void 
the agreement in its entirety.”).
71. See Sub10k, Inc. v. Nat’l Mktg. Servs., Ltd., 819 N.Y.S.2d 775 (2d Dep’t 2006).
72. See In re Estate of Wilson, 50 N.Y.2d at 66, 67. The court stated:
Once the partners to a union renounce their incipient state of separation in favor of 
maintaining their coupled status, absent any indication to the contrary, it is to be 
assumed that, writing on a clean slate, they intended all vestiges of the agreement that 
was to serve to memorialize their separation also fall.
 Id. at 66.
The principle that a reconciliation or failure to actually separate constitutes an implied 
revocation of the agreement in its entirety . . . is founded upon the judicial sensitivity to 
the reasonable and legal expectations of contracting parties that a separation agreement 
will continue in effect only while they are actually separated.
 Id. at 67 (Gabrielli, J., concurring).
73. Granchelli, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
380
SiFre v. SiFre
the entire agreement is unenforceable,74 including any provisions that required its 
termination, or abandonment, to be in writing. Therefore, whether there has been an 
abandonment of the agreement is always a question of fact.75 Even a provision in the 
Agreement that explicitly stated that no abandonment shall take effect unless agreed 
to by the Sifres’ in writing would not be wholly effective because abandonment is a 
question of fact and the fact-finder must still determine if the parties intended by 
their conduct to abandon the agreement.76 As stated in In re Estate of Wilson, 
reconciliation “constitutes an implied revocation of the agreement in its entirety.”77 
To hold as a matter of law, as the Third Department did, that Mr. and Mrs. Sifre 
could not abandon the Agreement without conforming to the writing requirement of 
the termination provision was an impermissible construction of the Agreement 
wholly at odds with existing law.78
 The Third Department did more than just fabricate a new ground for divorce in 
New York and over-reach in its interpretation of the Agreement. By interpreting the 
termination clause at issue in the Agreement to mean that evidence of abandonment 
in the form of reconciliation between the parties is inadmissible, the court also 
interpreted the Agreement in a manner that rendered it contrary to public policy.79 
Therefore, the agreement itself is also void.80
 Perpetuation of the home is essential to modern society and to the welfare of the 
community.81 It has thus long been established under New York law that any 
agreement between husband and wife that seeks to break up the home by promoting 
the procurement of a divorce is contrary to public policy and is void.82 Separation 
agreements are generally an exception to this principle. The law’s “tolerant attitude” 
74. See Thomas D. Crandall & Douglas J. Whaley, Cases, Problems, and Materials on 
Contracts 132 (4th ed. 2004) (“A contract is defined as a promise the law will enforce . . . . That 
[promise] is what the law calls consideration.”).
75. See Estate of Rothko v. Reis, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 324 (1977); see also Green v. Doniger, 84 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1st 
Dep’t 1948); Wilson, 50 N.Y.2d at 66; In re Estate of Whiteford, 314 N.Y.S.2d 811, 813 (3d Dep’t 1970) 
(“The existence of such intent [to abandon the separation agreement] is primarily a factual question, to 
be decided . . . by the trier of fact . . . .”).
76. See Katz v. Beckman, 756 N.Y.S.2d 258, 259 (2d Dep’t 2003).
77. 50 N.Y.2d at 67 (Gabrielli, J., concurring).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 62–77. 
79. See infra text accompanying notes 84–93.
80. See infra note 84.
81. See Stahl v. Stahl, 221 N.Y.S.2d 931, 939 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1961).
82. 7 Samuel Williston & Richard A. Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 16:19 (4th ed. 
2010); see also Reid v. McLeary, 706 N.Y.S.2d 179, 180 (2d Dep’t 2000) (“No cause of action exists to 
enforce an agreement the main objective of which is to dissolve a marriage and to facilitate a divorce.”); 
Niman v. Niman, 181 N.Y.S.2d 260, 263 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1958); P.B. v. L.B., 855 N.Y.S.2d 836, 
843 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County 2008) (“The parties to a separation agreement are not entirely free to 
contract as they choose; their agreement must conform to the laws of New York State.”); Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 190(2) (1981) (“A promise that tends unreasonably to encourage divorce or 
separation is unenforceable on grounds of public policy.”).
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toward these agreements recognizes that in such cases “public policy is not offended” 
because the parties have already separated and the agreements are made while they 
are living apart.83 However, a provision in a separation agreement that frustrates the 
potential reconciliation of married persons who are separated is against the state’s 
clearly articulated public policy because it helps them procure such a divorce.84 Here, 
the Third Department interpreted the termination clause to prohibit Mrs. Sifre from 
introducing evidence of reconciliation.85 By prohibiting the introduction of evidence 
demonstrating a possible reconciliation, the court made it impossible for the 
Agreement to be abandoned.86 Without any apparent avenue for abandoning the 
Agreement, it will remain valid despite any extrinsic acts or circumstances and will 
serve as the basis for a conversion divorce regardless of whether the Sifres reconciled. 
This is not to say that if evidence of reconciliation were introduced, the agreement 
would automatically be abandoned; a fact-finding must still occur. But if the parties 
did reconcile and resume marital relations, then any agreement which deems that 
reconciliation “irrelevant” must be void on public policy grounds because it allows for 
a divorce where the parties have resumed marital relations.87 It follows that a clause 
in a separation agreement interpreted to have the effect of prohibiting evidence of 
reconciliation is contrary to public policy. As clearly articulated in In re Estate of 
Britcher, “[a] provision in [a] separation agreement providing that the agreement shall 
not be invalidated without a subsequent writing is itself void” and renders the entire 
agreement unenforceable.88
 It is clear that the Third Department erred in granting Mr. Sifre’s motion for 
summary judgment, thereby granting him a conversion divorce from Mrs. Sifre despite 
her allegations that the parties had reconciled. Reconciliation is a question of fact that 
must be decided by the fact-finder.89 By prohibiting the introduction of such evidence, 
the court in effect fabricated a ground for divorce that is not permitted by New York 
83. Stahl, 221 N.Y.S.2d at 939. (“The more tolerant attitude extended toward separation agreements made 
while the parties are living apart, or in prospect of immediate separation, is conditioned upon a 
recognition that in such cases public policy is not offended because the contract does not bring about the 
separation nor promote the marital discord.”).
84. See Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63, 67 (1977). There are cases that have found a clause in the 
agreement expressly requiring the reconciliation to be in writing not void because the clause does not 
prevent the introduction of evidence regarding reconciliation, but simply shifts the burden of proof onto 
the non-moving party. See, e.g., Katz v. Beckman, 756 N.Y.S.2d 258 (2d Dep’t 2003). 
85. See Sifre II, 878 N.Y.S.2d 798, 800 (3d Dep’t 2009).
86. See In re Estate of Schanzer, 182 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1st Dep’t 1959), aff ’d, 8 N.Y.2d 972 (1960); General 
Motors Accept. Corp. v. Clifton-Fine Cent. Sch. Dist., 85 N.Y.2d 232, 236 (1995); Lippman v. 
Lippman, 596 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242 (4th Dep’t 1993) (“Abandonment may be shown circumstantially . . . 
[and is] to be resolved by proof of the acts and expressions of the parties . . . .”); In re Estate of Wilson, 
50 N.Y.2d 59, 66 (1980) (“[C]onduct of the spouses may be understood to manifest an intention to void 
the agreement in its entirety.”).
87. See supra notes 84–85.
88. 833 N.Y.S.2d 332, 333 (4th Dep’t 2007).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 34–37. 
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statute.90 The court’s reason for prohibiting such evidence to be introduced was the 
result of an impermissible construction of Mr. and Mrs. Sifre’s separation agreement; 
specifically, interjecting the word and meaning of “abandon” where the parties had 
deliberately chosen “terminate.”91 The overall effect of these impermissible acts 
rendered the entire Agreement void, as the court’s interpretation allowed Mr. Sifre to 
procure a divorce from Mrs. Sifre even though she claimed the parties had reconciled 
and were no longer separated—an act clearly offensive to public policy.92 Granting 
Mr. Sifre a divorce under such circumstances was improper. 
90. See supra text accompanying notes 46–57.
91. See Sifre II, 878 N.Y.S.2d at 799, 800; see also supra text accompanying notes 58–82.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 85–93.
